Pericles

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Pericles last won the day on December 1 2019

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  1. I didn't say that you did. My participation on this forum ends here.
  2. It's not clear what was raised or not. OP seems to recount some type of oral argument (for which there is no record) where these issues were argued. My reply was only an attempt to answer the specific question immediately quoted above that portion of my reply. OP will have to incorporate whatever can be gleaned (from that case) into the complete knowledge of was has transpired in OP's case, and combine that with whatever rules govern how the appeal is conducted. At first blush, it seems to be a loser on appeal. But I'm not familiar with the licensing statutes in WY, and their application to debt buyers vis-a-vis the filing of a lawsuit. If it is a problem, history should have some evidence. OP might do well to research fdcpa cases filed in the district.
  3. Which are the state statutes? The definitions are relevant. Unifund claims to be a debt collector on their website, but that disclosure is distinct from meeting a statutory definition. And there might be one standard in order to meet the definition of a "debt collector" for the purposes of doing certain types of activity within a state, and yet another standard to meet the definition of a "debt collector" for the purposes of the fdcpa. Although state statutes often mirror at least some language within the fdcpa. For the purposes of the fdcpa, post Henson, the relevant test to apply is the principal purpose test. There have been fdcpa decisions that have come down on both sides of this, when the test is applied to debt buyers. This case discusses the distinction between purchasing title to an entire account versus just purchasing the receivables. But that may not be exactly what is going on in your case.
  4. See CCP § 704.070. "Paid earnings that can be traced into deposit accounts or in the form of cash or its equivalent" But "earnings" (as defined in CCP § 706.011) means "compensation payable by an employer to an employee". I don't know if the section would apply to non-employees such as contractors or the ubiquitous "gig" type stuff that has replaced "wages" paid by an employer.
  5. Those are the fees charged by your bank for the processing of the levy legal documents. Your bank has likely frozen whatever funds are left in your account, or at least some multiple of the judgment amount. If some substantial amount is frozen, then you don't have much leverage to negotiate. Unless you can offer more than the amount that is frozen. If the levy is based on a judgment for a case that was decided on the merits, then it is unlikely that any arguments about the judgment amount will be considered. All you can argue at this point is why funds that your bank has frozen might be exempt from levy. From your link; If the funds in your checking account are earnings deposited within 30 days prior to the date of the levy, then 75% of that amount should be exempt. If the amount that they can levy is reduced, this may increase your leverage to negotiate a settlement of the remaining amount of the judgment.
  6. I'm pretty sure that the AAA's administrative determination is all that is required. I haven't seen any arbitration agreement that specifies application of the consumer rules. Since the business rules weren't expressly indicated, the question is for the AAA to administratively decide, at least at the filing stage. That sentence follows "We have not received the signed submission letter or $3,050 filing fees from the business.". My reading of the two sentences together is that they don't have the authority because the fees have not been paid.
  7. Interesting that the AAA did not invoke rule R-1(d) of the consumer arbitration rules, as they typically do in debt buyer cases (see rejection letter previously posted on the forum here). When the AAA invokes rule R-1(d), they tell everybody that they can just go to court instead (see below). In your letter, it seems that resubmission of the same claim to the AAA would be permitted. Maybe the business in your case does not have a "previously-filed consumer matter" in which they also did not pay the fees within the time provided.
  8. Happy Thanksgiving everybody!
  9. The steps to pursue a rule 1006 procedure to strike the appeal are as follows: 1. Once 20 days pass (since the date of service of the notice of appeal), if a complaint has not been filed, fill out the form “Notice of Praecipe to Enter Judgment of Non Pros”, and send it to the other side. 2. Wait ten more days. 3. If the ten days pass and the other side still have not sent you a complaint, file a “Praecipe for Non Pros”. service of notice of appeal —> wait 20 days —> send notice of praecipe —> wait 10 days —> file praecipe See page 7 of this document for further details. Read this case, and all cases cited within, for further information about the rule 1006 procedure.
  10. That seems like (not exactly, but functionally) making the determination based upon residency rather than "court" jurisdiction. There is some precedent for that mode of evaluation. Though consideration of some counterfactual ("would have been filed") is a rather tricky thing to do. There are a lot of possible worlds. Patent trolls and other forum shoppers typically go for "court" jurisdiction rather than residency. That british last-week guy on hbo brought this point to light just a few days ago (SLAPP Suits @Time:12:22). Neither the last-week guy nor the coal guy were residents of west virginia, yet there the jurisdiction was established and remained for 2+ years. Maybe it is just somewhat difficult to fit arbitration and court into the same "lawsuit" framework. Maybe alternatives shouldn't be lumped together for definitional purposes. As you say, any arbitrator or other can pretty much decide any way or other about this question, and non-parties will likely not ever know how any of it was decided. Though I really can't imagine that if a filing party filed in jam's district of columbia office, that any arbitrator would use that filing as a basis for determining the sol to be 3 years. But I can imagine an arbitrator applying delaware law over a possible counterfactual.
  11. AAA case filings, if not filed online, are mailed to new jersey. Jams has regional offices in selected states. Is your interpretation of the language in the arbitration agreement that the state law (for sol) is determined by the state in which the arbitration administrator's physical location is present, assuming that such location accepted the initial filing? So, the sol, for the example case as described in this thread, would be 4 years if the initial demand filing was mailed to a jams regional office in california?
  12. Assume that arbitration counterclaims are a "lawsuit". Further assume that all of such claims originate in arbitration in the first instance, without any prior court involvement. What state law other than Delaware could possibly apply? How would that state jurisdiction obtain?
  13. Recent discover agreements have the following language; OP mentioned in another thread that discover initiated the jams case after OP sent correspondence to their attorney with a request for arbitration. All of this apparently happened before any lawsuit was filed in OP's home state. If this is correct, there are no competing interests (with regard to sol) of any other state.
  14. It appears that in colorado the small claims division generally doesn't allow representation. See c.r.s. rule 509 & 520. Chapter 26 - The Colorado Rules of Procedure for Small Claims Courts If these are the applicable rules, they probably didn't file the complaint in the small claims division. However, if pra is using an in-house attorney, the rules may allow it. Prior forum posts by active members from colorado (e.g. here) seem to indicate that these sorts of cases are filed in county court but not in the small claims division.
  15. The citi carve-out (cut out) language is in the first post to this thread. The citi carve-out language is vastly different than the non-mutual limitation language in synchrony agreements. The citi language also sometimes has delegation, whereas the synchrony language does not. A court really shouldn't have any trouble with interpretation of the synchrony language, though it has happened quite a bit. As others have said, the best way to argue that the synchrony language is not any limitation whatsoever on the "you" party [as defined], is to restate the entirety of the language but with all of the pronouns replaced with the concrete party names to which those pronouns refer in the instant case.