Brillianthoney

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About Brillianthoney

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  1. if an entity is ordered by the court to perform an act within 30 days or their case is dismissed; files an appeal with appealate court on day 25; subsequently files a volunatry dismissal of the appeal 3 months later; performs court ordered axn during the appeals process but after the deadline (30 days) given by court order; then files a motion to proceed--(1)Does their filing a voluntary dismissal negate the tolling of time during the appeals process? (2)I am assuming time was tolled during the appeals process. Was it? (3) any caselaw on this?
  2. Here is the background, Summons, and my questions; Sometime in Sept 2002, I called OC twice asking for the breakdown of the costs and what the vehicle sold for etc. after receiving untimely notice of sale (car auctioned off after Aug 2002). I don't have dates for these calls, wasn't that cognizant at the time to write them down just figured OC didn't really have to tell me anything since they did not send me any info. Deficiency balance given as $7506. I then sent them two letters by certified mail in Jan 04 and Feb 04 (after finding CIC) requesting they explain to me in writing how they figured out the amount I owed them and also informing them they had violated FL repo statutes. OC never sent written explanation but did send letter in Mar 04 stating they had carefully researched my account and my credit report info had been adjusted to provide an accurate history of my account. Applied for mortagage in late Mar or early Apr 2004 (have to find credit report) and saw midland reporting repo with re-aged info. They had not sent me a letter with the mini-miranda. April 04 sent letter to OC and cc'd Midland informing both of the reaging. Told OC I would sue them if TL wasn't deleted immediately and said according to Nelson v Chase they were responsible for how Midland reported the TL. Received letter from MID beginning of May/End of April 2004 saying they were now the servicer of my loan and $8759 was due upon receipt. This was my first communication from them and the 30 day mini-miranda isn't anywhere in the letter. They just state that the letter is a communication from a debt collector and info obtained will be used for that purpose. Sent DV to MID by certified mailed beginning of May 2004. Mid-June 2004 received letter from them with signed contract attached (same as exhibit A) but no written explanation of how amount was calculated as I requested in DV letter. Made copy of contract but sent original back to MID stating it was not validation of the debt and was only cursory at best and that I did not want to receive any further communication from them unless they were supplying the info I had requested. Received letter from Hayt & Hayt Dec 2004 saying they had been retained to collect the outstanding debt. They give the mini-miranda. Dec 2004 send DV to Hayt & Hayt and also informed them of the illegal repo by Bank One. Jan 05 Hayt sends me first page of contract with my signature on it and Ohio certificate of title with my name on it Jan 15 I send letter to Hayt informing them they hadn't supplied me with debt validation, returned the documents they send (after having made a copy of them but didn't tell them that) and again requested proper validation of the debt. Received Summons 8/22/05 Summons reads 1. damages within jurisiction limits of this court 2. defendant resides X county Fl 3. in even matter resolved by default reasonable attorney's fee would be $750 4. plaintiff is owner and holder of debt pursuant to any assignment from the oc 5. defendant execute and delivered a retail installment contract with plaintiff's assignor to purchase automobile. (see exhibt A: which is a copy of the contract with my signature) 6. defendant failed to pay the installment due and plaintiff's assignor elected to accelerate the balance 7. that subsequent to default the above automobile was repossessed 8.plaintiff'a assignor, pursuant to florida statutes, notified defendant of the intended sale date of the automobile. 9. defendant failed to redeem said automobile. 10. sale of the auto was conducted in acommercially reasonable manner and reasonable expenses were incurred. plaintiff is entitled to the deficiency between the original purchase price and the sale price. (see exhibit A). 11. plaintiff has engaged the services of the undersigned attorney and has agreed to pay him a reasonable fee. 12. all condition precedent to the bringing of this action have ocurred. wherefore plaintiff demands judgement in its favor and against defendant in the principal amount due of $8648.54 together with interest, court costs, and any other relief this court may deem just and proper. Questions #3. doesn't more info have to be given about how these fees were determined #4. i know repo are different than cc but can midland be a holder of the debt by assignment. Also, I do not see any assignment clause in the contract but I am going to reread it again to make sure. #8 BankOne (oc) did not properly notify me. I voluntarily had the car repo (pre-AOC). Set-up the pick-up with the customer rep at my home in Florida. OC sent deficiency info to old address in Texas. By time I recieved the forwarded mail, it was too late to do anything. Beginning deficiency balance was $7506. #9 this was violated wasn't it because they did not send notice to sell to current address on record (where they had the car repo'd)? car repo'd Aug 2002. #10 OC never responded to my requests for written explanation of the amount owed. #11 Again how do I know these are reasonable fees?
  3. Any comments/critiques on the arguments below appreciated. I know there are many typos and will clean them up tomorrow. CONTINUED/ADDITIONAL ORAL ARGUMENTS FOR MOTION TO ORDER PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS HEARING <is this titled correctly? 1. The production of documents sought are within the scope of permissible discovery in that they are relevant to the subject matter of this action because the documents are the basis of the Plaintiff’s Quantum Meruit Count, Unjust Enrichment Count, and Breach of Contract Count in the suit brought against Defendant. 2. The elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are: 1) the plaintiff and defendant entered a valid contract, 2) the defendant breached the contract, and 3) the plaintiff suffered damages caused by the defendant’s breach. See Beck v. Lazard Freres & Co., LLC, 175 F.3d 913, 914 (11th Cir. 1999); Air Caledonie International v. AAR Parts Trading, 2004 WL 943209 (S.D. Fla. 2004); Bland v. Freightliner, LLC, 206 F.Supp.2d 1202, 1210 (M.D. Fla. 2002); Knowles v. C.I.T. Corp., 346 So. 2d 1042, 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Collections, USA, Inc. v. City of Homestead, 816 So.2d 1225, 1227, n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); J.J. Gumberg Co. v. Janis Services, Inc., 847 So.2d 1048, 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Abbot Laboratories, Inc. v. General Elec. Capital, 765 So. 2d 737, 740 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). 3. In this case: 1) the Defendant has never entered into a contract with Asset Acceptance LLC nor has Asset Acceptance produced a signed document whereby the defendant agreed to pay Asset Acceptance or admitted the alleged debt was hers, 2) it is impossible for Asset Acceptance LLC to perform the fudiciary obligations of the original creditor of the alleged debt as Asset Acceptance is not a bank, savings and loan, etc. This factual situation renders an impossibility of performance for Asset Acceptance LLC and therefore Defendant’s obligation to perform under the contract is excused because of the impossibility of performance by Asset Acceptance LLC. See Home Design Center Joint Venture v. County Appliance of Naples, Inc, 563 So. 2d 767, 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), 3) The Plaintiff did not suffer damages from the alleged breach of contract as it would be impossible for the Plaintiff to offer the services rendered in the contract and therefore plaintiff could not and did not confer any benefits upon the Defendant. The only damages the Plaintiff might have suffered by the alleged breach of contract are the actual damages (the purchase price) the Plaintiff inflicted upon himself by purchasing the alleged debt without recourse and at risk to himself. 4. The proper measure of damages for breach of a contract is the loss or injury actually sustained rather than the price agreed to be paid on full performance. See Poinsetia Dairy Products v. Wessel Co., 123 Fla. 120, 166 So. 306, 104 A.L.R. 216 (1936). The only damages the Plaintiff might have sustained by the alleged breach of contract are the actual damages (the purchase price) the Plaintiff inflicted upon himself by purchasing the alleged debt without recourse and at risk to himself. 5. The elements of a cause of action for Quantum Meruit are:1) Absence of an express agreement, 2) Plaintiff provided a benefit in the form of goods and services accepted by the defendant, 3) Under ordinary circumstances a reasonable person would reasonably expect to pay for such benefit, 4) Plaintiff failed to pay for the benefit, and 5) Damages. See Commerce Partnership 8098 Limited Partnership v. Equity Contracting Co., 695 So. 2d 383, 386-87 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)(discussing in detail relationship between claims for quasi-contract and quantum meruit); Tooltrend, Inc. v. CMT Utensili, SRL, 198 F 3rd 802 (11th Cir. 1999); Ship Const. & Funding Serv. (USA), Inc. v. Star Cruises, PLC, 174 F. Supp. 2nd 1320, 1326-27 (S.D. Fla. 2001); In re DeCecco, 234 B.R. 543, 544 (M.D. Fla. 1999); Moncreif v. Hall, 63 So. 2d 640, 642 (Fla. 1953); W.R. Townsend Contracting, Inc. v. Jensen Civil Const., Inc., 728 So. 2d 297, 305 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Daniel Levine & Co. Realtors v. Beach Enter. Ltd., 549 So. 2d 1131, 1132 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1989); Osteen v. Morris, 481 So. 2d 1287, 1289-90 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). 6. In this case: 2) the Defendant alleges plaintiff did not provide a benefit in the form of goods and services that were accepted by the defendant because of the impossibility of performance by the Plaintiff for such goods and services; 3) the Defendant does not believe under ordinary circumstances a reasonable person would pay for goods or services that were not rendered; 4) the Defendant denies failing to pay for alleged benefits; 5) Before liability in damages can arise, it is necessary that a sufficient causal relation exist between the damage claimed and the act alleged to have caused the damage. See Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. Peters, 77 Fla. 411, 83 So. 559 (1919); Stager v. Florida East Ry. Co. 163 So. 2d 15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1994). The damages recoverable in any case must be certain, both in nature and with respect to the cause from which they proceed. See Pallardy-Watrous Ins. Agency v M. Tucker, Inc., 120 Fla. 895, 163 So. 284 (1935); National Educ. Centers, Inc. v. Kirkland, 635 So. 2d 33, 90 Ed. Law Rep. 1305 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1993), on reh’g (Feb 2, 1994). There can be no recovery unless it is shown with reasonable certainty that a loss resulted from the wrong alleged. Kenan v. Austin, 146 Fla. 389, 1 So. 2d 174 (1941); Reitano v. Peninsular Bldg. Supply Co., 262 So. 2d 710 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1972); Westbtook V. Bacskai, 103 So. 2d 241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1958). Florida law requires that the injured party take reasonable steps to limit the extent of the injury and under the doctrine of avoidable consequences, a party cannot recover damages flowing from consequences that the party could reasonably have avoided by the exercise of due care. See Azemco (North America), Inc. v. Brown, 553 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1989); Juvenile Diabetes Foundation v. Rievman, 370 So. 2d 33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1979). If a plaintiff, by the reasonable exertion or care, can prevent damages resulting from the defendant’s wrongful acts, he or she has a duty to do so, and as far as prevention is possible, recovery is precluded. See Nello L. Teer Co. v. Hollywood Golf Estates, Inc., 324 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1963); Moses v Autuono, 56 Fla. 499, 47 So. 925 (1908); Winter v. American Auto. a&#036;&#036;’n, 149 So. 2d 386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1963). The plaintiff’s claim fails to show a mitigation of the alleged damages, therefore, relief for such a claim is precluded. The factual allegations of the plaintiff’s claim shows the plaintiff intentionally brought injury to himself by purchasing without recourse from the original creditor the defaulted debt allegedly belonging to the Defendant. 7. Now, there is a disparity between the purchase price (the actual damages the Plaintiff suffered by doing injury to himself by purchasing the debt) and the alleged value of the alleged debt, therefore, any damages the Plaintiff might be entitled to for such a claim is an equitable issue. The only equity the Plaintiff has in the alleged debt is for the amount the Plaintiff paid to purchase the alleged debt. The granting of the Plaintiff’s demand in the Complaint would result in unjust enrichment as the Plaintiff would receive more money than Plaintiff is entitled to receive. 8. The elements of a cause of action for unjust enrichment are: 1) Plaintiff has conferred benefit on the defendant, who has knowledge thereof, 2) Defendant voluntarily accepts and retains the benefit conferred, and 3) The circumstances render the defendant’s retention of the benefit inequitable unless the defendant pays to the plaintiff the value of the benefit. See Nova Information Systems, Inc. v. Greenwich Insurance Co., 365 F.3d 996, 1006-07 (11th Cir. 2004); Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital Reseach Institute, Inc., 264 F.Supp.2d 1064, 1072 (S.D.Fla. 2003); Shibata v. Lim, 133 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1316 (M.D. Fla. 2000); Cole Taylor Bank v. Shannon, 772 So.2d 546, 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Swindell v. Crowson, 712 So. 2d 1162, 1163 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); N.G.L. Travel Assoc. v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 764 So.2d 672, 675 n. 5 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2000); Cohen v. Kravit Estate Buyers, Inc., 843 So.2d 989, 992 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Duncan v. Kasim, Inc., 2002 WL 125686, (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); N.G.L. Travel Associates v. Celebrite Cruitses, Inc., 764 So.2d 672, 675, n. 5 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). 9. In this case the Defendant alleges that the Plaintiff did not extend credit to the Defendant or confer any fiduciary benefits upon the Defendant as it is not a bank, savings and loan, or fiduciary. The allegations upon which the Plaintiff rely are distinct from the alleged contract Defendant had with the original creditor and therefore should not be seen as an enforcement of that contract. 10. Justice Terrell authored an opinion for the Florida Supreme Court in 1953 which supports my conclusion. In Wood v. Black, 60 So.2d 15 (Fla. 1952), the court held that a general contractor who had partially completed the building of a house without a license, hence the illegality of the contract, could recover the reasonable value of labor and material furnished based on quantum meruit. The court held that Wood was not seeking to recover on the contract. He was seeking to recover the actual cost of labor, material and services furnished to Black with Black’s knowledge and approval. 11. This case is even a step removed from the Wood case. JDB did not contract with the Defendant to offer an extension of credit, banking services, or fiduciary services. JDB bought the alleged defaulted debt of the defendant without recourse and at their own risk for the sole purpose of profit. The only entitlement JDB may have to an unjust enrichment claim would be for the actual damages (the purchase price of the alleged debt) they sustained in their attempt to make a profit. Damages which are the results of acts or commissions committed by the Plaintiff. 12. The FDCPA (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act) covers the activities of a “debt collector.” There is a two-part definition of “debt collector”: any person [1] who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or [2] who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another. 15 U.S.C. 1692a(6). The creditor itself is excluded from the definition of “debt collector,” unless it uses a name which suggests that a third-party debt collector is involved in the collection process. 13. A company which takes an assignment of a debt in default, and is a business the principal purpose of which is to collect debts, may be subject to the Act, even if the assignment is permanent and without any further rights in the assignor. See Commercial Service of Perry v. Fitzgerald, 856 P.2d 58, 62 (Colo. App. 1993). 14. As long as the purchaser asserts that the debt was in default when acquired, the FDCPA applies, even if the assertion proves to be false. See Schlosser v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., 323 F. 3d 534 (7th Cir. 2003). 15. During the Motion for Order to Produce Documents hearing, the Plaintiff’s attorney stated that the Plaintiff was a debt buyer who had purchased the defaulted debt allegedly belonging to the Defendant. This factual admission by Plaintiff’s counsel supports the Defendant’s conclusion that the Plaintiff is “a person” subject to the FDCPA. 16. Federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction of FDCPA suits. 15 U.S.C. 1692k(d). 17. Since the Plaintiff is subject to the FDCPA, caselaw concerning FDCPA issues are relevant to the Plaintiff’s Complaint. 18. One of the most important rights conferred by the FDCPA is the debtor’s right to “validation” or “verification” of a debt under 15 U.S.C. 1692g. 19. Among the areas that have been held discoverable in FDCPA cases are: (a) The source of a debt and the amount a bad debt buyer paid for debt, 213 (D. Conn. 1998); Coppola v. Arrow Financial Services, 302 CV577, 2002 WL 32173704 (D. Conn., Oct 29, 2000); Kimbro v. IC System, 301CV1676, 2002 WL 1816820 (D. Conn. July 22, 2002). ( How amount sought was calculated. Coppola v. Arrow Financial Services, 302 CV577, 2002 WL 32173704 (D. Conn., Oct 29, 2000); Kimbro v. IC System, 301 CV1676, 2002 WL 1816820 (D. Conn. July 22, 2002). © Where in issue, list of reports to credit bureaus. Coppola v. Arrow Financial Services, 302CV577, 2002 WL 32173704 (D.Conn., Oct. 29, 2002). (d) Documents conferring authority on defendant to collect debt. Coppola v. Arrow Financial Services, 302CV577, 2002 WL 32173704 (D.Conn., Oct. 29, 2002); Kimbro v. IC System, 301CV1676, 2002 WL 1816820 (D.Conn. July 22, 2002); Yancey v. Hooten, 180 F.R.D. 203 (D.Conn. 1998) 20. Coppola v. Arrow Financial Services, 302 CV577, 2002 WL 32173704 (D. Conn., Oct 29, 2000)-“Information relating to the purchase of a bad debt is not proprietary or burdensome [emphasis added]. Debtor must phrase their request clearly to obtain: The source of a debt and the amount a bad debt buyer paid for plaintiff’s debt, how amount sought was calculated, where in issue a list of reports to credit bureaus, and documents conferring authority on defendant to collect debt.” 21. In order to receive the protection of attorney-client privilege, a communication must, inter alia, be made for the purpose of securing primarily either (a) an opinion on law, ( legal services, or © assistance in some legal proceeding. In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 98-99 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The privilege does not extend to the provision of business or other non-legal advice simply because a lawyer happens to be involved. Communications with a lawyer that relate primarily to non-legal purposes, for example, business, technical or corporate public relations purposes, are not privileged. See, e.g., Fine v. Facet Aerospace Prods. Co., 133 F.R.D. 439, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (report not privileged where communications by in-house counsel were likely made for general business purposes and the report contained no legal advice); United States Postal Service v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp, 852 F.Supp. 156, 163 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (communications relating to lobbying and legislative activities between in-house counsel and law firm retained to lobby not privileged). Under these principles, it is clear that if, for example, Asset Acceptance LLC routinely maintains business records of its purchase of a defaulted debt or Providian Bank routinely maintains business records of its accounts charged to profit and loss, the business records would not be privileged. 22. Caselaw, Coppola v. Arrow Financial Services, 302 CV577, 2002 WL 32173704 (D. Conn., Oct 29, 2000), has already established that the amount a “debt buyer” purchased for a debt is not proprietary or burdensome therefore the amount the Plaintiff paid for the alleged debt of the Defendant is not protected by trade secret as the Plaintiff’s attorney argued during the Motion for Order to Produce Documents hearing. 23. The Defendant stating she had received documents from the Plaintiff that the Plaintiff’s attorney identified as about 20 statements and a signed contract is not an admittance by the Defendant that the alleged debt is hers. 24. Whereas the Defendant has demonstrated the relevance of knowing the amount the Plaintiff paid for alleged debt, and whereas the Defendant has demonstrated that the amount the Plaintiff paid for the alleged debt is not protected by trade secrete, and whereas the purpose of sanctions for discovery abuse is both to punish the recalcitrant party in hopes that the sanction will serve as a deterrent of similar conduct by others in future litigation. 25. The Defendant respectfully requests that Plaintiff/Plaintiff’s counsel be ordered to provide a copy of documents showing what jdb paid for the alleged debt of the Defendant. 26. In addition, the Defendant also requests that the Plaintiff’s lawsuit be dismissed with prejudice should Plaintiff not comply with an order to compel production. 27. This motion is also based on the papers and records filed in this action and on any oral and documentary evidence that was presented at the hearing on this motion.
  4. i downloaded and printed out a copy of the florida rules of civil procedure. although it explains various types of counterclaims, it doesn't state how much time they have to respond. no resource i have found yet on fl civil counterclaims does.
  5. Is it necessary for a plaintiff to formerly respond to a defendant's counterclaims in Florida civil court? If so, how long do they have to respond? If they have passed the time limit, am I permitted to file msj on the counterclaims? Finally, is there a good manual for all the little ins and out of FL civil procedure that I can buy? I can find tons of info on the general stuff, but it is the little questions about practical matters I often find hanging me up.
  6. DocDon, Fraudfighter specifically wanted me to have you to answer the two questions I have asked above in this post. Please explain it to me like I'm 10 years old--I've been in and out of the hospital over the last two weeks including today with my pregnant daughter who is expecting my first grandchild in four weeks and I'm working really hard not to let life frazzle my brain.
  7. I used Copppola vs. Arrow and Kimbro vs IC System. The jdb attorney kept arguing they weren't relevant to the debt collection suit. He said Coppola might have some relevance if I were suing the jdb for fdcpa violations (I am countersuing them but failed to mention that during the motion hearing will do so when submitting arguments) but since they were suing me Coppola wasn't relevant. He then told the judge he couldn't find any relevance for Kimbro whatsoever and that I was uninformed about the law. His main points was that knowing the amount jdb paid for the debt was irrelevant and even if it were relevant it was protected by trade secret.
  8. I have ten days to submit more arguments for a motion to compel production. I have asked the jdb for documents showing amount alleged debt was purchased for. jdb refused based on relevance and trade secret. 1. How is this info(amt paid for debt) relevant to the debt the jdb is attempting to collect? Caselaw? 2. Even if I know what they paid for the debt, why wouldn't I owe the jdb the full amount for the debt (like I would the oc) if the debt was assigned to them? Caselaw? These are the two questions the judge asked me a couple of times? I need a very strong argument for number 2.
  9. I rechecked the civil rules and called ask the clerk of courts what was noted in the file on the hearing. Note files state the judge allowed me to amend my request for production. I also remember her stating plaintiff would have the requisite number of days to comply and if they didn't to bring it to the court's attention. Therefore, I am making another motion to compel and this time I will include sanctions. Should any wording be changed in the 2 paragraphs below? 5. On XXX, 2005 during the Motion For Order To Produce Documents hearing, counsel agreed with the Honorable Judge's statement that there wasn't any reason why Defendant, , could not have copies of the documents showing what was paid for the alleged debt. Counsel also stated the request had not been complied with because the Defendant’s initial request for these documents had not been understood. 6. The Honorable Judge then ruled that the Defendant should submit an Amended Request For Production; counsel would have its requisite number of days to comply with the amended request; and if counsel did not comply with the amended request, Defendant should bring it to the court’s attention. Among my sanctions will be a request to dismiss with prejudice (do I need to give a statutory reason why or would stating: dismiss with prejudice for failure to comply be enough? And a monetary award for the expenses it has cost me in preparing both motions, for hearing, and attending hearing.
  10. Since the judge told asset to tell me how much they paid for the debt after I filed an amended motion for production, can I file a motion to compel production and sanctions for the amended motion I sent and assset hasn't answered. Of course, I will asked to be reimbursed for the time it has cost me away from my research and since I am filing another motion, have to prep for the hearing on this second motion and attend the hearing for the second motion, I think that will take me up to about 20 hrs @ $200/hr.
  11. Can I include as part of sanctions the time it cost me to prepare the motion; prepare for the hearing; attend the hearing. A main part of my regular job is research. My starting charges would be $200 per hour for doing my type of research for someone else or say leading a seminar teaching others to do what I do. As a pro se novice, I spent a total of 15 hrs in the courthouse library, online, and typing to take care of this matter. Would this fly with this court? Doing this is taking away from my own research time which is vital in keeping my job as well as advancing my career.
  12. I will file the motion for sanctions. As I am looking over the form I have from a FL Civil Procedure book, it list specific sanctions, such as how much it cost me to file the motion itself and the $ amount it cost to obtain the production of the documents. I don't think I have any of those costs so what types of sanctions would I ask for. I don't know if I would want to preclude what they paid for it as according to what I've read on this site and AOC it seems it would be much less than the $2000 I was offering them to settle. Now I am only offering mutual dismissal with them deleting all tradeline notations and inquiries related to the account. I have a countersuit going for $15000 so I am hoping that will help inspire them to see things my way, especially if I have a piece of paper from them showing they only paid $500 for the alleged $8k debt anyhow. Since I am getting my energy back and they seem bent on ticking me off, I may very well push for money and deletions.
  13. I had a motion to compel production hearing whereby the judge ruled that Asset needed to give me documentation showing what they paid for my alleged debt after I amended my motion to compel so that it clearly asked for it. It has been 31 calendar days since I mailed the amendement so they have four left to get the info to me. I don't think they are going to send it. The judge said if they didn't respond to bring it to the court's attention. Not obeying the judge's order puts them in contempt of court right? What do I title the document I file to bring this to the judge's attention and what should it say?
  14. Below is the settlement offered I and Asset have agreed to. Are there any loopholes in it for Asset? I am paying with the understanding that they will dismissa with prejudice (they cannot refile) and that all tradelines associated with this alleged debt will be deleted by Asset. Have I covered all my bases? The offer below is made in the spirit of compromise and goodwill only and is not an admission of any obligation to Asset Acceptance LLC and cannot be used as evidence in any legal action to enforce the alleged debt. This Agreement is entered into on the date below between Creditor, and , Debtor. Whereas, Asset Acceptance LLC has alleged that Debtor owes him $8XXX.XX Whereas, Creditor has filed Civil Action No. in the County Court in and for ,, seeking a monetary judgment; and Whereas, Creditor and Debtor desire to settle their differences and end the above identified litigation . Therefore, in consideration of the undertakings set forth below, Asset Acceptance LLC and Debtor hereby agree as follows: 1. Upon check clearing, Asset Acceptance LLC will file in the County Court in and for X County, a voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice in the above-identified litigation. 2. Asset Acceptance LLC further agrees not to make any future claim or bring any future action against Debtor for the acts alleged, or which could have been alleged, in Civil Action No. , occurring up to the time of the entry of the voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice identified in Paragraph 1 of this Agreement. 3. Debtor and Asset Acceptance LLC hereby release each other from all claims each has against the other arising from the substance of Civil Action No. . 4. Debtor will, within five business days of executing this Agreement, pay to Asset Acceptance LLC the sum of $2000.00 as full settlement of any claim of Asset Acceptance LLC against Debtor. 5. Upon check clearing, Asset Acceptance LLC agrees to delete all tradelines and inquiries related to this debt from the files maintained by the major credit reporting agencies. 6. Debtor and Asset Acceptance LLC will bear their own costs, expenses and attorneys’ fees. 7. This Agreement embodies the entire understanding between Debtor and Asset Acceptance LLC relating to the subject matter of this Agreement and merges all prior discussions between them. 8. A facsimile or copy of this settlement/agreement may be treated as the original. 9. This is a legally binding contract. Both parties have entered into this Agreement voluntarily and will be bound by it. 10. The person signing this for Asset Acceptance LLC represents he is authorized to bind Asset Acceptance LLC to this agreement, and Debtor relies on this representation. “This offer is made in good faith in the spirit of compromise. I dispute this obligation. This offer is not nor shall be construed as an admission or acknowledgement of any kind. I reserve and invoke my rights under the law.”